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ABSTRACT. Among the functions of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) was the establishment of a 
series of mechanisms to enable its Indigenous signatories to continue their subsistence practices. Central to these mechanisms 
were commitments to create a co-management regime for the area’s wildlife. In 1995, 20 years after the Agreement was signed, 
Lorraine Brooke published an analysis of Inuit experiences of the regime. This article extends her study, presenting the present 
structures of wildlife management in Nunavik, particularly as of the mid-2000s. It explores the extent to which the federal and 
provincial government commitments laid out in the JBNQA have been fulfilled and assesses the contemporary relevance of 
Brooke’s conclusions. Based on interviews with Inuit and non-Inuit stakeholders, including bureaucrats and individual hunters 
and fishers, the paper outlines the diverse perspectives of those who administer and who are subject to the enforcement of 
Nunavik’s wildlife management regime. It concludes that many of the findings from Brooke’s analysis persist. The region 
continues to be subject to complex bureaucratic and administrative structures that routinely make power sharing between Inuit 
and non-Inuit government agencies problematic.
Key words: Inuit; Indigenous; James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement; Nunavik; wildlife management; land claims; 
subsistence; co-management
RÉSUMÉ. Parmi les modalités de la Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois (CBJNQ), notons l’établissement d’une 
série de mécanismes permettant à ses signataires autochtones de continuer à exploiter les ressources à des fins de subsistance. 
Une série d’engagements visant à créer un régime de cogestion de la faune de la région était à la base même de ces mécanismes. 
En 1995, 20 ans après la signature de la convention, Lorraine Brooke a publié une analyse au sujet des expériences des Inuits 
par rapport à ce régime. Cet article se veut le prolongement de son étude et présente les structures actuelles de gestion de 
la faune du Nunavik, plus particulièrement depuis le milieu des années 2000. L’article explore la mesure dans laquelle les 
engagements du gouvernement fédéral et du gouvernement provincial énoncés dans la CBJNQ ont été respectés, et évalue la 
pertinence contemporaine des conclusions de Lorraine Brooke. En se fondant sur des entrevues réalisées auprès d’intervenants 
inuits et non inuits, y compris des bureaucrates ainsi que des chasseurs et des pêcheurs particuliers, l’article fait état des 
diverses perspectives de ceux qui administrent le régime et de ceux qui sont assujettis à l’application du régime de gestion de 
la faune du Nunavik. Il conclut que grand nombre des constatations découlant de l’analyse de Lorraine Brooke sont encore 
valables. La région continue de faire l’objet de structures bureaucratiques et administratives complexes qui rendent problé-
matique le partage du pouvoir usuel entre les organismes gouvernementaux inuits et non inuits.
Mots clés : Inuit; Autochtone; Convention de la Baie-James et du Nord québécois; Nunavik; gestion de la faune; revendications 
territoriales; subsistance; cogestion
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INTRODUCTION
Across Inuit Nunangat, demand for primary resources, 
coupled with climate change, is compelling the Inuit to 
confront increased pressure on the resources of their 
territories. Furthermore, in Nunavik—the Inuit region of 
northern Quebec created as a result of the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA)—the provincial 
government’s Plan Nord will escalate and facilitate 
resource development in the region (see Gouvernement 
du Québec, 2015; Fabbi et al., 2017). Launched by the 
Government of Quebec in 2011, Plan Nord is a 25-year 
economic development initiative involving the region north 
of the 49th parallel. Its focus is on energy, mining, forestry, 
tourism, and bio-foods. 
The challenge confronting the Inuit and the various 
governments operating on their homelands is to determine 
just how increased resource development will affect the 
sustainability of the territory (Canadian Polar Commission, 
2014; Rodon and Schott, 2014). The leadership of various 
Inuit organizations is now also facing the prospect 
of promoting resource development; with growing 
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populations, this may appear to be the only route to finance 
their endeavours and provide employment for the people 
they represent (KRG and Makivik Corporation, 2010). Inuit 
therefore recognize the challenges of balancing subsistence 
activities with other forms of development that have and 
will occur on their lands.
Pressures on the conditions necessary to sustain Inuit 
hunting, fishing, and trapping are not new. They are 
manifestations of the ongoing impacts of centuries of settler 
colonial invasion and occupation through which the loss of 
territorial control and self-determination became central 
features of Indigenous peoples’ struggles to preserve their 
lands and ways of life. They are also essential components 
of proclamations and treaties that Indigenous peoples 
have signed first with imperial and later settler colonial 
governments. Amongst others, these treaties represented 
covenants by these governments to provide services and 
reserve lands for Indigenous peoples in exchange for the 
right of shared occupation. An important element of those 
promises is the right to preserve the conditions that allow 
Indigenous peoples to continue their subsistence practices. 
Yet in the aftermath of these claims, some question their 
efficacy. They argue that the land claims, far from enabling 
the creation of effective systems of Indigenous governance, 
embody and perpetuate settler colonial modes of conceiving 
of land and resources, entrenching non-Indigenous values 
and practices—including management systems—that 
promote resource extraction and threaten the very activities 
Indigenous peoples were seeking to protect (Gagnon, 
1982; Brooke, 1995; Alfred, 2005; Suluk and Blakney, 
2008; Coulthard, 2014; Rodon, 2014; Kulchyski, 2015). As 
we shall see, for the Inuit of Nunavik the outcomes of the 
JBNQA do, in some ways, appear to confirm such concerns 
(see Brooke, 1995; Fenge, 2008, 2013; McCarthy, 2013; 
Orkin, 2013).
In a Canadian context the James Bay and Northern 
Quebec Agreement is historically significant. Signed in 
1975, it was the first modern, comprehensive land claim in 
Canada. As such, it represents a landmark whose outcomes, 
with the passage of time, merit closer scrutiny. To what 
degree have the commitments undertaken by the federal 
and provincial governments been fulfilled? Given the 
struggle of Indigenous parties to the JBNQA during the 
negotiations to preserve the conditions that would permit 
them to continue to practice their subsistence activities, 
what has been the outcome?
In this context, this article will examine the ways in 
which wildlife management in Nunavik has developed in 
the aftermath of the JBNQA. It will pay particular attention 
to the institutions and mechanisms that determine the 
management of the territory’s wildlife and discuss the 
degree to which, and some of the reasons why, the various 
structures agreed to in the land claims have been realized. 
In doing so, it will update Brooke’s analysis of 1995. 
Her work documents Inuit experiences during the first 
20 years of Nunavik’s wildlife management regime. As 
such, it serves as a benchmark for future such analyses. 
Among other difficulties, she notes that the Inuit had to 
contend with complex bureaucratic and administrative 
structures; poor power-sharing arrangements between 
Inuit and non-Inuit; lack of common belief systems 
structuring wildlife management, with a consequent 
undermining of Inuit concepts and systems of resource use 
and management; lack of control by Inuit over lands and 
resources; poor communication leading to disengagement 
on the part of Inuit and an inability to make joint decisions 
effectively; combative relations between Inuit and state 
regulators; insufficient funding for the implementation of 
management structures; and struggles with governments 
over the interpretation and application of the JBNQA, 
thus necessitating the negotiation of further agreements. 
Approximately 20 years after Brooke’s article and 40 years 
since the JBNQA was signed, it is worth considering the 
degree to which these issues persist.
My findings are based partially on 29 recorded 
interviews personally conducted in Kuujjuaq and 
Puvirnituq, Nunavik, and in southern Quebec between 
2006 and 2008. These were verified and updated in 
2018 (details below). Both Nunavik settlements are 
large, regional centres with significant non-Inuit 
populations. They have played important opposing roles 
in the implementation of the JBNQA. Kuujjuaq, as an 
administrative centre, has become the hub of regional and 
provincial management facilities and operations. Whereas 
Puvirnituq, which refused to sign the JBNQA, questioned 
the Agreement’s fundamental legitimacy. The interviews, 
which involved 11 Inuit and 18 non-Inuit, included 
employees of local, regional, provincial, and federal 
wildlife management bureaus, representatives of Inuit 
organizations—including Makivik Corporation, Kuujjuaq’s 
landholding corporation, and members of the regional and 
community hunting, fishing, and trapping associations 
(see below for more discussion)—owners of outfitting 
camps, members of co-management boards, and Inuit and 
non-Inuit inhabitants of the two settlements. Participants 
were selected either because they were representatives of 
agencies involved in wildlife management or, using the 
snowball sampling technique, because they were actively 
engaged in hunting, fishing, or trapping. Amongst the non-
Inuit were people who had lived in the region for anywhere 
from two to over 30 years. Although the initial interviews 
took place in 2006 – 08, it is significant that many of the 
issues the respondents brought up were echoed in a five-
year protection plan (2010 – 15) that was elaborated for 
Nunavik’s wildlife resources (KRG et al., 2010). In 2018, 
the details of these earlier interviews were verified and 
updated through 11 unrecorded interviews (9 Inuit; 2 non-
Inuit) in Puvirnituq and Kuujjuaq with representatives 
of both public and ethnic agencies involved in wildlife 
management. Where significant changes occurred in the 
interim, I make note of these. Interview responses cited in 
the paper are presented anonymously.
To understand the elaboration of state-based wildlife 
management after the signing of the JBNQA we need to 
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grasp the structural mechanisms on which it is founded. 
The circumstances under which the JBNQA was signed are 
therefore outlined below, as are the fundamental building 
blocks it established for wildlife management in Nunavik. I 
introduce the various laws, regulations, and government and 
non-government actors, as well as subsequent agreements 
signed between Inuit and provincial, federal, territorial, and 
Indigenous governments and agencies that have shaped the 
formal mechanisms for wildlife management in the region. 
I examine the ways in which the enforcement of regulations 
has evolved since signing of the Agreement and review 
some of the reasons for changes that were brought about 
in the mid-2000s. I conclude with an assessment of the 
perceptions of various stakeholders in Nunavik’s wildlife 
management regime, in light of Brooke’s analysis of the 
same structures. 
LAND CLAIMS AND NEW REGIMES OF 
GOVERNANCE
Nunavik was created in response to massive resource 
development that threatened the subsistence practices of the 
Indigenous peoples of the region. In 1971 the government 
of Quebec announced plans to develop hydroelectricity 
on rivers flowing primarily into James Bay. It had not 
informed, let alone consulted or gained permission 
from, the Cree, Inuit, and Naskapi, on whose territories 
the development was to take place. Following a court 
battle, where they managed to bring the development to a 
brief halt, the Inuit and Cree (and later the Naskapi) were 
ultimately obliged to negotiate a land claims agreement. 
With construction already begun, the JBNQA was brokered 
at breakneck speed (see Rouland, 1978 and La Rusic et 
al., 1979 for a time line). In exchange for extinguishment 
of their title to the land, the Indigenous parties to the 
Agreement were promised a number of rights and services 
by the federal and provincial governments, including those 
in the realm of wildlife management. In this regard, Feit 
(1979) identifies four issues of concern to the Cree at the 
time of these negotiations. First, that their right to hunt at 
all times and in all places with a minimum of oversight 
be entrenched. Second, that they have an effective role 
in wildlife management. Third, that conflicts with non-
Indigenous hunters and fishers be resolved. Fourth, that any 
future development not have an impact on the subsistence 
activities of the region’s Indigenous peoples. These issues 
explain the centrality of the wildlife management regime in 
the Agreement. 
Similarly, in policy statements issued since the JBNQA’s 
conclusion, Inuit have repeatedly stressed their desire to 
preserve the conditions necessary for the continuation 
of their subsistence activities. These statements include 
Plan Nunavik (KRG and Makivik Corporation, 2010), 
Parnasimautik (Makivik Corporation et al., 2014), and 
the “2015 Nunavik Inuit Declaration: Proud, United 
and Determined” (Makivik Corporation, 2015). In 
Parnasimautik (Makivik Corporation et al., 2014:39), Inuit 
are unequivocal that governments have failed to live up to 
their commitments concerning wildlife management. They 
stress the need for “partnership” with the government, the 
protection of their harvesting areas, and the requirement 
to devolve wildlife management, monitoring, research, 
conservation, and enforcement to the regional level. In the 
Nunavik Inuit Declaration (Makivik Corporation, 2015:1, 
2), they insist that relations with government and industry 
be based on “equality and mutual respect,” and stress that 
Inuit place a “priority of subsistence wildlife harvesting 
over all other uses.” The emphasis on “partnership” and 
“equality and mutual respect” underscore the conditions 
Inuit see as necessary for relations with non-Inuit. Yet as 
researchers have pointed out, Inuit have been frustrated 
by the failures and delays in implementing the JBNQA’s 
environmental and wildlife management regimes (Gagnon, 
1982; Brooke, 1995; Peters, 1999). 
Despite the declared gap in fulfillment of legal 
co-management responsibilities, researchers comparing 
the region to northern jurisdictions elsewhere in Canada 
consider that Inuit in Nunavik have gained a superior degree 
of independence from federal and provincial governments 
(Rodon and Grey, 2009; Coates et al., 2014; Wilson, 2017). 
All the same, these researchers acknowledge the challenges 
presented with self-government, particularly in light of 
the fact that the management structures it gave rise to are 
essentially reflections and impositions of non-Inuit modes 
of governance. Brooke’s assessment (1995:i) was that such 
impositions in the realm of wildlife management had 
rendered the regime set up by the JBNQA “inadequate” 
and had “left a legacy of frustration and incompetence 
for all participants.” It is important, therefore, not only to 
consider some of the formal elements that structure wildlife 
management in Nunavik, but also to assess the degree to 
which these have been effectively implemented. 
The components of the Agreement that principally 
define Nunavik’s wildlife management regime are Sections 
3, 7, and 24. To understand how they function, we need to 
consider the ways in which people (section 3) and property 
(section 7) have combined to determine just how access 
to the wildlife in the region is regulated (section 24). As 
we shall see, each component constructs and sustains 
the others, and collectively they define how wildlife 
management functions in Nunavik.
In general, wildlife management can only be understood 
as fundamentally linked to the property relations that 
regulate access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, 
and alienation of the resources involved, whether material 
or immaterial (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). This linkage 
raises questions about the bases on which these property 
rights are determined. At the same time, constructions of 
property itself need fundamentally to be understood as 
resting upon the beliefs and social institutions that define 
and regulate property (Banner, 1999). Ultimately, in other 
words, property is best understood not so much in terms 
of people’s rights to things, but in terms of the relations 
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between people with respect to things (Singer, 2000). To 
understand how systems of property function, we need to 
clarify the social relations that construct them. Property 
and social relations can then be situated as essential 
components of a wildlife management apparatus. 
The JBNQA developed two key mechanisms to delineate 
access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation 
of resources. These entailed creating new, legally defined 
categories for people and land. The categories can be seen as 
tools to protect and promote Inuit subsistence practices, but 
they also served as a means to legitimize legally the opening 
up of lands and resources to the settler state and its populace.
PRODUCING NEW PEOPLE
The Agreement (section 3) divides the population 
of Nunavik into “beneficiaries” (who have come to be 
synonymous with Inuit) and non-beneficiaries (non-
Inuit) (Grammond, 2008). For the purposes of wildlife 
management, the latter are further differentiated into 
“resident” and non-resident. Each has a different meaning 
according to the agency regulating their activities. For the 
province of Quebec, non-residents are non-beneficiaries 
who do not live in Quebec. For landholding corporations 
(see below), the status of non-beneficiary resident and non-
resident is determined independently by each municipality 
according to the number of consecutive years an individual 
has lived in the settlement. In Kuujjuaq in 2018, for 
example, non-beneficiaries become residents after 12 
consecutive years of residence in the town. Depending on 
their residency status, non-beneficiaries also have particular 
hunting and fishing rights, and particular fees levied against 
them for these rights. 
With the aim of protecting Indigenous subsistence 
production and reducing conf lict over resources, 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have hierarchically 
differentiated rights to wildlife (see Feit, 1979; Gagnon, 
1982; Otis, 2002). Subject to the principle of conservation 
(paragraph 24.1.5 and subsection 24.2), and according to 
guaranteed levels, harvesting by beneficiaries has priority 
(subsection 24.6). This priority applies to hunting, fishing, 
and trapping, with trapping—subject to some limitations 
(paragraph 24.3.20)—being exclusive to Inuit. Once 
these needs have been met, and subject to restrictions, the 
Agreement permits sport hunting and fishing by non-Inuit 
(subsection 24.8), with Quebec residents having greater 
rights than non-residents. Finally, at the bottom of the 
hierarchy is commercial food production for export from 
the region. Again, this is subject to government quotas and 
may only be permitted if all other needs have been met. For 
Inuit, then, the key function is harvesting whereas for non-
Inuit, the key function is sport.
Having thus defined people (and their rights of access 
to and withdrawal of resources), the JBNQA consequently 
defined their property relations. As we shall see, during the 
negotiations this involved serious discord.
PRODUCING NEW PROPERTY RELATIONS
From the outset, negotiations over the land regime 
were problematic for the Inuit. Since it was already theirs, 
the notion of “claiming” land made no sense to some. 
In addition, the requirement to extinguish their title 
was deeply troubling. As a result, three communities—
Puvirnituq, Salluit, and Ivujivik—initially refused to sign 
the Agreement (see ITN, 1977; Rouland, 1978; Brooke, 
1995; Canobbio, 2009; Qumaq, 2010; Hervé, 2017b; 
Nungak, 2017). Today, Puvirnituq is the only holdout. In 
addition, the government subjected the Inuit to apparently 
arbitrary restrictions, limiting their selection of land 
to 50% of the coastline, despite the fact that Inuit are 
fundamentally a maritime people. Moreover, what lands 
they did select were whittled away to meet other demands 
of government and third parties, such as mining companies 
(Brooke, 1995). Eventually, however, most Inuit identified 
and claimed their lands according to the regime laid out in 
the Agreement.
Section 7 of the JBNQA divided Nunavik land into three 
categories: I, II and III (Fig. 1). The administrative and 
use rights associated with each category depends on one’s 
status as beneficiary or non-beneficiary. A fundamental 
and problematic feature of this system is that it created 
settlement-specific territories. Historically, however, Inuit 
moved seasonally to locations within a wide area. Their 
gradual move to settlements in the 1950s confined them 
to areas that did not reflect the far larger territories they 
had used and with which they were affiliated. The rigidly 
delineated, settlement-specific land categories created by 
the JBNQA thus countermand the flexibility of use that is 
inherent to Inuit hunting, fishing, and trapping practices. 
They leave Inuit access to wildlife subject to non-Inuit 
frameworks of classification, restriction, and administration 
(Brooke, 1995). Hence, for example, although Inuit in 
northern Quebec had traditionally frequented offshore 
islands to hunt, fish, and gather, the letter of the law laid out 
in the Agreement prevented them from doing so, as these 
islands were outside their jurisdiction.
Title to JBNQA Category I lands belongs to Inuit 
landholding corporations (LHCs) created in all of the 
settlements that signed on to the Agreement. The lands 
themselves may not be sold or ceded except to the Crown, 
and their subsurface rights remain with the Province of 
Quebec. They are subject to expropriation by both federal 
and provincial governments, but in the event that this 
occurs, the relevant government must either replace them 
with similar lands or provide monetary compensation, 
according to the LHC’s preference (see Gagnon, 1982; Otis, 
2002). The ethnically based landholding corporations are 
controlled by beneficiaries and are empowered to manage 
and develop Category I lands. Beneficiaries have exclusive 
hunting and fishing rights in these lands, although non-
beneficiaries may do so if permitted by the relevant LHC. 
Category II lands are owned by the province of Quebec, 
but beneficiaries have exclusive hunting, fishing, and 
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FIG. 1. Nunavik land categories. Map adapted by permission from Cartographic Services, Nunavik Research Centre, Makivik Corporation. 
trapping rights thereon. Again, non-beneficiary hunting 
and fishing may be permitted on these lands by the relevant 
LHC. Once more, subject to the principle of replacement, 
the federal and provincial governments may expropriate the 
lands for development.
Category III designates Crown lands open to access 
and use by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Any 
development of these lands is subject to the co-management 
regime established under the Agreement (see below). 
As Brooke (1995) points out, Category I and II lands 
must absorb the pressures created by policies, programs, 
and activities on lands designated as Category III. Such 
pressures are likely to grow as the Plan Nord leads to 
increased development in Nunavik. Thus, as has happened 
to Indigenous peoples farther south, the Inuit risk being 
left without a sustainable land base. Aware of this, in their 
Nunavik Inuit Declaration they called for an expanded 
and adequate land base for wildlife harvesting (Makivik 
Corporation, 2015). 
In its ideal form, then, the JBNQA established legally 
defined entities, people and property, and the relations 
between them that distributed access to resources; that 
is, the basic structure of a wildlife management plan. 
Under section 24 of the Agreement, unrestricted hunting, 
fishing, and trapping within Nunavik is legally available 
only to beneficiaries (subsection 24.3), although this may 
be subject to limits, including those established by the 
principle of conservation. Where these are applied in 
such a way as to affect the Indigenous parties, however, 
they are ideally meant to be in the form of guidelines or 
advisory programs. Only if these prove ineffective are more 
restrictive regulations to be used. Regulations must have a 
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minimum impact on beneficiaries, however, and must take 
into account their food production, sociocultural traditions, 
access to resources, and economies (Feit, 1979). In contrast, 
non-beneficiaries’ sport hunting and fishing are meant to 
be more restricted. The practices must respect not only the 
provincial and federal regulations but also be restricted to 
Category III lands unless, as previously stated, an LHC 
permits them on its Category I and II lands. In these cases, 
non-beneficiaries must also respect the LHC’s regulations 
(see below). 
These various elements of the wildlife management 
regime are woven into a series of formal regulatory 
structures, some of which are specific to the region, while 
others apply to supra-regional systems of management. 
We need, therefore, to understand these administrative 
structures.
FORMAL CONSTITUENTS OF NUNAVIK’S 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT REGIME
There is no literature that identifies the various 
components of existing wildlife management structures 
in Nunavik. The region has a remarkably fragmented 
system of governance (Rodon and Grey, 2009; see Wilson, 
2017), which is a challenge to anyone seeking to grasp the 
agencies involved in and regulations applying to wildlife 
management in Nunavik. Moreover, existing structures 
may have begun with the signing of the JBNQA in 1975 but 
have since evolved. For example, prior to the imposition on 
their territories of settler colonial borders, Inuit harvested 
lands and waters across what has become Nunavut, 
Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador. To address these 
areas of overlapping use, the Nunavik Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement (NILCA) of 2007 was signed by Makivik 
Corporation and the governments of Canada and Nunavut. 
The NILCA applies to the offshore region around Quebec, 
as well as northern Labrador and an offshore area adjacent 
to Labrador (see Government of Canada, 2008; KRG et 
al., 2010). It adds another important layer to the regulatory 
milieu. Yet in addition to the JBNQA and the NILCA, 
an array of other regulations, laws, agreements, and 
conventions need to be taken into account to understand 
the contemporary operation of wildlife management in 
Nunavik (Table 1). Although these are all in force in theory 
in Nunavik, in practice, as we shall see, their enforcement 
has often been challenging.
The official agencies involved in the regulation 
of wildlife management are many and varied. Some 
operate within the realm of public government and have 
responsibility for wildlife in specific environments. These 
agencies, in turn, are represented in the region by a variety 
of individual actors, each with specific responsibilities 
within Nunavik’s wildlife management structures (see 
Table 2). Ideally the agencies and their representatives 
work together, but appointing the various actors has been a 
challenge for many public institutions (see below).
In addition to the public agencies, a number of 
institutions have been mandated to represent exclusively 
beneficiary or ethnic interests (Table 3).
These public and ethnic agencies are meant to work 
in concert, for example, as members of co-management 
boards (Table 4). The most influential of these are the 
Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping Coordinating Committee 
(HFTCC) and the Nunavik Marine Region Wildlife Board 
(NMRWB).
According to Feit (1979), the various co-management 
boards set up under the JBNQA were intended to 
counterbalance the limited lands on which Indigenous 
parties to the Agreement have exclusive harvesting rights. 
They were thus designed to give Indigenous peoples a voice 
in management decisions made on Category III lands. But 
researchers have documented limitations on this input 
caused by underlying power imbalances and a lack of shared 
cultural understanding with regard to social interactions 
and wildlife management (see La Rusic et al., 1979; 
Gagnon, 1982; Brooke, 1995; Peters, 1999, 2003; Nadasdy, 
2003; Natcher et al., 2005; Breton-Honeyman et al., 2016). 
Although these boards were set up to influence decision-
making within government, they do not in practice challenge 
government authority to legislate or regulate (La Rusic et al., 
1979). Thus, although the NMRWB’s authority is greater 
than that of the HFTCC, government ultimately retains 
ministerial control over the decisions made by both boards. 
Hence, for example, in 2016 the governments of Canada and 
Nunavut changed the South Hudson Bay polar bear quotas 
set by the NMRWB (Makivik Corporation, 2017).
Clearly the decisions of these co-management boards 
both affect the activities of, and should rely on input from, 
Indigenous harvesters. La Rusic et al. (1979) argue that the 
JBNQA represents one more step in Indigenous peoples’ 
loss of autonomy, decision-making powers, and control 
over their activities. They contend that the Agreement 
requires harvesters to become ‘managers,’ which implies a 
need for an entity to contain and transmit their management 
advice. Yet, although paragraph 24.3.24 of the JBNQA 
made mention of the need for the provincial and federal 
governments to “take all reasonable measures, within the 
scope of current programs or those programs which may 
from time to time be established, including economic 
measures, to assist the Cree and Inuit parties in establishing 
trappers’ associations” (Gouvernement du Québec, 
1998:365), the Agreement did not formally create any 
agency at the community level to represent Inuit hunters, 
fishers, and trappers. The associations that have historically 
existed have therefore had limited and unpredictable 
funding, generally with operational funds provided by 
Makivik Corporation and project-related funds from the 
Kativik Regional Government. 
Brooke (1995) suggests that the financial dependence 
of these local hunting, fishing, and trapping associations 
(HFTAs) has restricted their freedom to promote their own 
agendas when these are not shared by their funders. Until 
recently, Nunavik’s HFTAs, whether through their regional 
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TABLE 1. Primary wildlife management regulations in effect in Nunavik in 2018.
Regulatory scale  Wildlife management regulations
International Convention on Biological Diversity 
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
 International Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitat 
 International Agreement on Humane Trapping Standards
National Fisheries Act 
 Marine Mammals Regulations (under the Fisheries Act)
 Migratory Birds Convention Act
 Navigable Waters Protection Act 
 Species at Risk Act
Provincial (Quebec) Act Respecting the Conservation and Development of Wildlife 
 Act Respecting Hunting and Fishing Rights in the James Bay and New Quebec Territories
 Regulations for sport hunting and fishing in zone 23 including permissible locations, appropriate licences, species-specific quotas and  
  weight restrictions, and species-specific dates for hunting and fishing
Local  Regulations defined by each municipality stipulating residency status for non-beneficiaries 
 Regulations defined by each LHC identifying the hunting and fishing rights of non-beneficiaries on Category I and II lands
or local associations, have also had no formal status in the 
various officially established decision-making processes 
related to its wildlife management (Brooke, 1995; see Suluk 
and Blakney, 2008 for similar discussion in Nunavut). 
Only in 2007, as a result of the Nunavik Inuit Land 
Claim Agreement (subsection 5.7), did the HFTAs (under 
the titles of LNUKs or Local Nunavimmi Umajulivijiit 
Katujiqatigininga and the RNUK or Regional Nunavimmi 
Umajulivijiit Katujiqatigininga) secure both official status 
in decision-making and limited ongoing funding from the 
NMRWB. But this authority and funding is restricted to 
decisions made in the Nunavik Marine Region identified 
under the NILCA. The lack of funding and official status 
has hampered the capacities of Inuit hunters, fishers, 
and trappers at the community level to participate on an 
ongoing basis in the official administration of wildlife 
regulations in the region. 
According to Feit (1979), the Cree negotiators sought to 
establish a wildlife management regime that did not hamper 
the day-to-day activities of harvesters, and so they set up 
a system that minimized government oversight of their 
activities (JBNQA paragraph 24.3.30). Perhaps this desire 
for limited government oversight explains why the HFTAs 
lacked funding and official status. But this omission might 
equally reflect the developmental logic of the state that 
was built into the JBNQA whereby collective rights and 
cultural practices that fell outside the state’s economic 
objectives were only included in decision-making if it 
became politically expedient to do so (Tester and Irniq, 
2008). Whatever the case, the HFTAs’ lack of funding 
and official status until recently stands in stark contrast to 
the situation in other Inuit jurisdictions, such as Nunavut, 
and has limited the capacity of Inuit harvesters to respond 
to developments affecting their activities. The problem is 
that it is generally at the local level that the competing and 
sometimes contradictory dynamics of wildlife management 
are most acutely experienced, and it is therefore at this 
level that Inuit harvesters have most needed powerful 
representation. Moreover, it is at the local level that the 
various state-sanctioned wildlife management regulations 
applying to Nunavik have tended to receive minimal 
oversight, and therefore the enforcement of wildlife 
regulations has generally been limited.
Due partly to an awareness of this problem, Makivik and 
a number of individuals involved in the formal representation 
of the interests of Inuit harvesters have been lobbying the 
provincial and federal governments to respect the principles 
of the JBNQA and provide increased funding, training, and 
presence of enforcement agents in the region. The provincial 
government has gradually responded, providing increased 
funding, first, through the Sanarrutik Agreement of 2002 
(section 4.5), and later, in 2004, through the Sivunirmut 
Agreement (section B.4). The question of outcome remains, 
however. Although the principal laws and regulations 
identified above have officially been in existence for some 
time, their actual implementation has been protracted. 
ENFORCING WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 
REGULATIONS
Lack of personnel with the power to enforce the wildlife 
management regulations has been a persistent problem 
in Nunavik. The enforcement regime of the JBNQA 
(subsection 24.10) stipulates that the preponderance of those 
enforcing the wildlife management regulations be Native. 
In order to achieve this, the governments of Quebec and 
Canada were required to provide the funding for training 
of Native conservation officers; modify the criteria required 
for acceptance to such training; and develop special 
programs, courses, and training facilities. However, these 
requirements have only been minimally achieved (see 
Gagnon, 1982; Brooke, 1995; Coates et al., 2014). According 
to one informant, for example, in about 1978 a few Inuit 
were trained and hired seasonally for a couple of years, but 
the money for the program was not guaranteed and then 
disappeared. According to Gagnon (1982), the government 
first attempted to train Native conservation officers in 
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Ethnic agencies 
Makivik Corporation, Resource Development Department 
Landholding corporations
Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Association (also known as Anguvigak or, 
under the NILCA, as Local Nunavimmi Umajulirijiit Katujjiqatigiinninga 
[LNUK])  
TABLE 3. Ethnic agencies and areas of responsibility for wildlife management in Nunavik in 2018.
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Makivik’s general mandate is to protect and represent Inuit rights and interests. 
It also manages the financial compensation provided to beneficiaries as a result 
of the JBNQA. One Vice-President is responsible for issues related to resource 
development, including activities related to wildlife management. It names Inuit 
representatives to Nunavik’s co-management boards.
 
Responsible for the administration, promotion and protection of Category I 
and II lands, in relation to hunting, fishing and trapping, mining exploration, 
environmental protection, and social and economic development. These 
corporations exist in the 15 Inuit settlements that signed the JBNQA, and are 
collectively represented by the Nunavik Landholding Corporations Association.
Responsible for representing the interests of Inuit hunters, fishers, and 
trappers in Nunavik. The organization, which is made up of locally elected 
representatives, derives its authority directly from the Inuit of Nunavik. Under 
the NILCA, it informs, gives advice, and makes recommendations to the 
Nunavik Marine Region Wildlife Management Board concerning the regulation 
of Nunavik Inuit harvesting (KRG, 2017a). It exists in all 16 Inuit settlements in 
Nunavik. They are collectively represented by a regional HFTA, also known as 
the Regional Nunavimmi Umajulirijiit Katujjiqatigiinninga (RNUK). 
TABLE 4. Principal co-management boards related to wildlife management in Nunavik in 2018.
Membership appointment
3 by Makivik,
3 by the Cree Nation Government, 
2 by the Naskapi, 
4 by the Government of Canada, 
4 by the Government of Quebec, and 
1 observer by the Société de développement
1 de la Baie James
3 by Makivik,
2 by the Government of Canada, and 
1 by the Government of Nunavut
Mandate 
Established under the JBNQA (subsection 24.4), it is a 
consultative body to government that examines and gives 
advice about bills, regulations, wildlife management measures, 
policies, and decisions that may affect the hunting, fishing, and 
trapping regime outlined in the Agreement. All government 
authorities must consult and receive recommendations from 
the Committee before acting. The responsible Ministers have 
discretion as to whether to follow the Committee’s advice. 
When the responsible Minister modifies or rejects the HFTCC’s 
recommendations he or she must consult with the Committee. 
Established under NILCA (subsection 5.2), it is the main 
instrument of wildlife management and the main regulator of 
access to wildlife in the Nunavik Marine Region (NMR). It 
has a research component and stresses the use of both Western 
science and Inuit traditional knowledge. It has sole authority 
over decisions related to total allowable take and non-quota 
limitations of harvesting for all species in the NMR. When the 
Minister modifies or rejects a decision by the NMRWB, the 
Board may respond with a final decision, which it may also 
make public. The Minister must then reconsider and provide 
reasons for rejecting or varying the MNRWB’s final decision. 
Co-management boards1 
Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping 
Coordinating Committee (HFTCC)
Nunavik Marine Region Wildlife Board 
(NMRWB) 
 1  In addition to the boards listed here, the JBNQA also led to the creation of the Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee, the 
Kativik Environmental Quality Commission, and the Federal Review Committee North. The NILCA led to the creation of the 
Nunavik Marine Region Impact Review Board and the Nunavik Marine Region Planning Commission.
1980, but struggled as it attempted to impose non-Native 
educational norms and standards on these individuals. 
As a result, training was continually delayed. This delay 
added to the frustrations of the Indigenous parties to the 
Agreement, who had been lobbying government to respect 
the commitment. In fact, the lack of both funding and 
personnel throughout Nunavik has continued to impede the 
enforcement of existing regulations (KRG et al., 2010). As a 
provincial bureaucrat acknowledged, it has only really been 
since the early 2000s that the province has tried to enforce 
wildlife regulations in Nunavik. 
Despite this, in 2006 – 08 and again in 2018, Inuit who 
are formally involved in wildlife management in the region 
continued to voice concerns about the lack of on-the-
ground personnel to enforce regulations. Those with full 
enforcement capacities (see Table 2) are few and have been 
based in Kuujjuaq (for terrestrial and freshwater wildlife) 
or even farther south for marine wildlife. Their capacity to 
patrol the entirety of Nunavik, let alone charge people with 
infractions, barely registers against the need. A number 
of Inuit involved in wildlife management in Nunavik have 
cited instances where they had been aware of infractions by 
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non-beneficiaries—residents of Nunavik and elsewhere—
that had not resulted in charges laid. 
In 2006, Kuujjuaq had two Inuit and one non-Inuit 
provincial Wildlife Protection Officers fully empowered to 
enforce and make arrests over infractions of terrestrial and 
freshwater regulations. By 2018, there were only two non-
Inuit Wildlife Protection Officers in Kuujjuaq. The result of 
this change, I was told by Inuit in 2018, was that non-Inuit 
officers were no longer patrolling with local people and so 
were less effective because they were unfamiliar with the 
land, trails, and routes. 
In 2007, a government representative told me that as 
part of the planned expansion of enforcement capacities in 
Nunavik, the province would set up an office in Inukjuak, 
with responsibilities for regulating the Hudson Bay coast. 
However, this has not occurred. I was also informed by 
various research participants that the federal and provincial 
governments intended to work with the Kativik Regional 
Government (KRG) in 2007 to train multidisciplinary, 
“fully-fledged” officers who would be armed and have 
all the powers and knowledge necessary to enforce both 
federal and provincial laws. Such plans had been long in the 
making. For example, the Sanarrutik Agreement, signed in 
2002, provided funding to hire and train six Inuit wildlife 
protection officers, as well as wildlife protection assistants. 
This also has not yet been done (see below). 
To the extent that Inuit do play a formal role in on-the-
ground enforcement of wildlife management regulations, 
they generally occupy subordinate administrative positions. 
The reasons for this reflect the colonial power relations 
structuring Nunavik’s management regime. Inuit, working 
either as Uumajuit Wardens or Technicians (see Table 
2), are based in most of the communities of Nunavik and 
work with both the federal Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO) and the Quebec Ministère des Forêts, de la 
Faune et des Parcs (Ministry of Forests, Wildlife and Parks 
[MFFP]). Although it is partially a cost-saving measure, 
the joint federal and provincial initiative also reflects the 
struggles, expressed by government representatives, of 
hiring, training, and retaining Inuit staff. In 2006 – 08 
and again in 2018, federal and regional government 
administrators said that it was difficult to find Inuit with the 
requisite education and the willingness, if needed, to charge 
friends and relatives with legal infractions. I have explored 
the issue of inducing Inuit to charge their peers with what 
amount to non-Inuit regulations elsewhere (Gombay, 2019). 
The question of educational qualifications is an ongoing 
problem. Despite the stipulation in the JBNQA to modify 
the training program, the province requires people to take 
a two-year course to qualify for the position. The course 
is offered only in French in southern Quebec. As a result, 
few Inuit occupy these posts, and non-Inuit hold jobs with 
greater powers of enforcement. Given these limitations, the 
KRG is urging the province to respect its commitments and 
develop alternative approaches to training Inuit.
For the time being, the primary personnel responsible 
for enforcing regulations across the region are thus the 
Uumajuit Wardens and Technicians. Ideally, they should be 
in each of the 14 settlements of Nunavik; in May 2018, they 
were in 12. As one Inuk put it in 2008, they are like “spies” 
in the settlements providing the eyes and ears and reporting 
to the government. Another Inuk compared them to the 
“special constables” used in the past by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police. They were given a certain authority, but 
denied ultimate control. In this person’s estimation it was, 
“the same old story; we can’t have full power.” Other 
beneficiaries spoke of their desire to have co-enforcement 
powers with the province of Quebec, but doubted it would 
be granted to them. An Inuk involved in various ethnic 
organizations repeated this in 2018, saying, “[the Province 
of] Quebec will never give up wildlife management.” These 
statements echo the observations of Feit (1979) and La Rusic 
et al. (1979) that, at the time of the JBNQA negotiations, 
the province was effectively unwilling to loosen its control 
over wildlife management. The result is that the region has 
a limited number of people with full enforcement powers. 
Many Inuit were of the opinion that the province, in not 
giving up its own power, was also ineffectual by holding 
on to it.
Although individual Inuit currently have limited powers 
to enforce wildlife regulations, the JBNQA, through 
creation of the LHCs, did formally give them a greater 
role in controlling hunting and fishing by non-Inuit. But 
again, these powers are restricted by the province. Thus, in 
addition to being required to follow provincial regulations, 
non-beneficiaries may also be subject to those imposed 
by Inuit through their LHCs. To hunt or fish on Category 
I and II lands, non-beneficiaries must buy permits from 
appropriate LHCs, with prices varying from settlement to 
settlement and depending on whether Inuit deem them to be 
residents. The question of authority to set residency status 
has caused some confusion. LHCs had understood this to 
be their prerogative. However, legally these powers lie with 
the municipal government, a public government agency 
(paragraphs 24.8.2 and 24.8.4 of the JBNQA). In essence, 
the province prevents their devolution to ethnically based 
agencies, retaining the prerogative to determine resource 
access for itself. To redress this imbalance and ensure 
greater control over non-beneficiaries’ sport hunting and 
fishing, the Inuit have called for this power to be transferred 
to the LHCs (Makivik Corporation et al., 2014).
In addition to obliging non-residents to buy permits, the 
LHCs can also limit the locations where they are allowed 
to hunt and fish and require them to use outfitters or guides 
(JBNQA paragraph 24.8.8). In Kuujjuaq, where non-
beneficiaries were known to fish and hunt on Category I 
and II lands without its permission, the LHC began, in the 
mid-2000s, to restrict the sites open to non-beneficiaries 
and to require them to hire a Kuujjuaq beneficiary guide. 
In 2018 non-Inuit could fish in just two lakes in summer and 
one in winter. Non-beneficiaries told me it is more difficult 
to get fish in these locations.
This complex array of actors and regulations has 
essentially come into being in Nunavik since the 1975 
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signing of the JBNQA. Yet the very existence of the 
regulatory structure begs the question of why it was 
necessary in the first place. 
INUIT PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 
ENFORCEMENT
According to Feit (1979), at the time of its negotiation, 
the Indigenous parties to the JBNQA voiced concerns 
dating back to the 1960s about competing with settlers for 
wildlife. Indigenous peoples had wanted not only to ensure 
that the regulations concerning wildlife be applied, but also 
that they have a voice in their formulation and application. 
This is one of the objectives that the Agreement was meant 
to have achieved. During the interviews I conducted 
between 2006 and 2008, provincial officials generally 
maintained that a limited number of non-transient, non-
beneficiaries went hunting and fishing without respecting 
the various regulations in force in Nunavik. In their view, 
such activities were both limited and diminishing as a result 
of the increased provincial enforcement of regulations 
in the early 2000s. Yet some Inuit felt that not only did 
they continue to compete with non-Inuit for resources, 
but also that they needed to have a greater say in wildlife 
management. 
Although some interviewees expressed concern about 
illegal non-beneficiary hunting and fishing throughout 
Nunavik, it appeared to be most marked in larger 
settlements such as Kuujjuaq where the greatest number 
of non-Inuit are concentrated. In certain instances, non-
beneficiaries were frequenting areas customarily used by 
beneficiaries (Gombay, 2014). These occurrences seemed 
particularly problematic in the early 2000s when large 
groups of non-beneficiaries went sport fishing or hunting 
with much expensive equipment and without a beneficiary 
guide. Their visibility made them the object of resentment 
amongst Inuit, some of who struggled to afford to go out on 
the land. 
Concern amongst Inuit about poorly regulated sport 
hunting and fishing by non-beneficiaries has also been 
voiced elsewhere in the region (KRG et al., 2010). For 
example, in both 2006 – 08 and 2018, Inuit expressed 
disquiet about small aircraft, particularly in the Ungava 
region, whose passengers fished and hunted without 
reporting to the authorities or adhering to regulations. 
Some speculated that the presence of these planes was 
linked to the greater number of outfitting camps in the 
region, which allowed transient non-beneficiaries to 
become more familiar with the region. Pilots seemed to 
know the limits of the different land categories and would 
camp just over the border in Category III lands. Inuit 
also spoke of people who were caught attempting to take 
Gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus) eggs (KRG et al., 2010). 
Partly as a result of these observations, some Inuit had 
begun to call for better enforcement of the hunting, fishing, 
and trapping regulations that apply to non-beneficiaries. 
Other events however also contributed to the sense that the 
non-beneficiaries were taking advantage of greater wealth 
and a regulatory vacuum to gain a form of privileged, 
illegal access to the region’s resources. The sense reflects 
La Rusic et al.’s (1979) contention that the JBNQA 
ultimately led to a loss of autonomy over their activities for 
the Indigenous signatories.
Beneficiaries, in fact, had also been the target of 
government hunting and fishing regulations. Since the 
Agreement makes beneficiaries’ harvesting subject to 
principles of conservation, they can also fall foul of state 
laws. In the mid-2000s, the first case arose concerning 
beluga hunting, a point of contention long in the making. 
By the mid-1980s, the DFO had concerns about the status of 
the beluga population in the waters surrounding Nunavik. 
In 1996 the agency established the first of a series of beluga 
management plans designed to control Inuit whale hunting. 
Although periodically renegotiated, these delimited the 
numbers harvested, the hunting seasons, and the locations 
where Inuit could hunt belugas (see Tyrrell, 2008; NMRWB 
n.d., 2017). As a consequence, in 2005 and 2006 Inuit were 
charged for hunting beluga in a closed zone and for going 
over the DFO quotas (George, 2008). The second case 
involved the provincial government charging a beneficiary 
for leaving fish in a net for too long. In both cases, although 
government charges were laid, they were not pursued.
These events caused significant tensions between 
Inuit and non-Inuit. The second case, where charges were 
brought for leaving fish in a net, was explained by one 
Inuk. The fisher had been prevented from checking his nets 
first by rough weather and then by the death of an elder, 
which had obliged him to stay in the settlement during a 
period of mourning. When eventually he did get the fish, 
following custom, he froze and later fed them to his dogs. 
The fish were not wasted. Those enforcing the regulations, 
said the Inuk, did not know Inuit culture; they should not 
be enforcing regulations in such ignorance. In the case of 
the beluga, another beneficiary similarly maintained that 
charging Inuit was inappropriate. The government should 
have understood that Inuit had, “the yearn[ing] to provide 
meat for others.” This example reflects the long-standing 
tradition amongst Inuit to share food (see Damas, 1972; 
Wenzel et al., 2000; Collings, 2011). These events had also 
resulted in a call by some Inuit for greater enforcement 
of provincial regulations; if state laws were being applied 
to them, so should they be applied to non-beneficiaries. 
Pervading this sentiment was the Inuit view that their 
perspectives concerning wildlife management were not 
being given due respect.
If the purpose of wildlife management is to enforce 
practices deemed to be correct according to a set of beliefs 
about how to hunt or fish in a manner that conserves the 
animals, these understandings, and the rules they give 
rise to, are not held only by the state. Inuit equally have 
regulations determining correct hunting and fishing 
procedures (see Fienup-Riordan, 1994, 2007; Hensel, 1996; 
Oosten et al., 1999). Thus, some beneficiaries spoke about 
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the failure of some non-beneficiaries to follow Inuit laws 
governing hunting and fishing, citing instances where non-
Inuit took only the hind quarters of caribou rather than the 
whole animal or used the wrong shot and injured animals 
without killing them. 
If the issue of controlling resource competition is central 
to any system of resource management, it becomes all 
the more complex where Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples, each with their own system of belief and resource 
management institutions, come into contact with each 
other. Thus, and not surprisingly, I encountered an array 
of perspectives in response to the increased enforcement of 
wildlife management regulations in Nunavik.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
REGULATIONS
The question of the legitimacy of the rules determining 
access rights to wildlife and the parties to whom these 
rightfully apply was a recurring theme in my conversations 
with interviewees. Reasons given for the enforcement of 
hunting and fishing regulations depended largely on the 
roles and ethnicities of the individuals concerned (KRG et 
al., 2010). 
As actors of the rational state, non-Inuit provincial 
and federal agents tasked with the region’s resource 
management held that since the laws existed, they must 
enforce them (Weber, 1961). Their primary concern was 
the conservation of resources, which, as a non-Inuit federal 
employee stated in the case of beluga, meant that, 
the government is trying to protect the beluga, because 
the only people who eat beluga are Inuit. We don’t eat 
them. So […] we’re trying to conserve the species so 
that the Inuit will be able to enjoy that animal in the 
future (author’s translation from French).
Implicit here is the belief that the state’s authority was being 
appropriately used to ensure the beluga’s conservation 
and that the Inuit ought to recognize this as in their best 
interests. 
Similarly, the logic of conservation governing wildlife 
regulations seemed fitting and self-evident to many 
non-beneficiary resource users, who had no concerns 
about following the rules (Gombay, 2014, 2019). Those 
interviewed in 2006 – 08 generally acknowledged that 
they observed the laws, even though some admitted that 
the increasingly strict enforcement of regulations that they 
had experienced since the early 2000s had been difficult 
to accept, especially in relation to fishing. In fact, some in 
Kuujjuaq revealed that they had occasionally hidden their 
fishing gear as they left the community in the hopes of not 
being seen. They had been seen, however, as some Inuit 
to whom I spoke mentioned that they were aware of these 
occurrences. 
Although most non-beneficiaries accepted the state’s 
regulations, some questioned the legitimacy of beneficiary 
institutions, stressing what they saw as the politics behind 
the enforcement of these regulations. They felt that the 
application of Inuit regulations served, not the interests 
of conservation, but larger reservations on the part of the 
Inuit about the increasing presence and influence of non-
Inuit in their territories. Inuit calls for better regulation 
enforcement, they felt, reflected ethnic tensions. These went 
both ways, however. One non-Inuit employee of an Inuit 
organization remarked that since Inuit were systematically 
breaking hunting regulations, such as the beluga quota, 
without being charged, some non-beneficiaries felt that they 
similarly should be allowed to disregard the law. According 
to this person, non-Inuit questioned why they should have 
to follow the rules set by Inuit LHCs with respect to their 
hunting and fishing on Category I and II lands. He went on 
to say that non-Inuit often failed to understand that the Inuit 
have legally prioritized harvesting rights under the JBNQA 
and that LHCs have the right to make decisions about 
resource use on Category I and II lands. 
The tit-for-tat dynamics at play in the region led one non-
beneficiary to state, “[I]f I have to respect the regulations 
related to hunting and fishing, well then so do they” 
(author’s translation from French). As a consequence, a 
non-Inuk living in Puvirnituq successfully lobbied the 
provincial government to permit non-beneficiaries to ice 
fish in certain locations, despite community opposition. 
Having opted not to sign the JBNQA, Puvirnituq lacked the 
land categories and state-sanctioned powers afforded by the 
Agreement to control non-beneficiary access to resources. 
Likewise, it was also noted that, whether as conscious 
acts of resistance to state laws or as unconscious expressions 
of respect for their own, Inuit were not necessarily aware 
of or applying the various state regulations. Inuit are 
accustomed to hunting and fishing with non-beneficiaries 
with whom they have social relations, for example. 
Strengthened regulation enforcement can pose problems 
for these non-beneficiaries, because no matter what their 
relations with Inuit, they are required to respect all relevant 
state laws. Both Inuit and non-Inuit involved in wildlife 
management thus said that Inuit need to become aware of 
the application of the JBNQA to non-beneficiaries and stop 
taking them hunting and fishing.
My interviews made it clear that some Inuit had neither 
accepted nor internalised government regulations and felt 
no need to enforce them on non-beneficiaries. Operating on 
beliefs associated with common property, which contained 
no place for ownership of land or wildlife, they felt that 
they had no right to exclude others from hunting or fishing 
(Gombay, 2014). In addition, the close ties that some had 
with non-beneficiaries made excluding them on principle 
from Inuit hunting and fishing trips feel simply wrong.
These feelings and beliefs are coming up against the 
impacts of an influx of non-beneficiaries to the region, 
however. A representative of Kuujjuaq’s LHC stated in 
2007 that the corporation’s members had started pressuring 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN NUNAVIK • 193
for enforcement of state-defined regulations. As a result, 
the LHC had increased the cost of non-beneficiary hunting 
and fishing permits for its Category I and II lands and 
waters and, as mentioned, had limited the areas where non-
beneficiary fishing was permitted. As several beneficiaries 
in both settlements asked, why should non-beneficiaries be 
allowed to hunt and fish for pleasure when resources are far 
more valued and significant for Inuit (Rogers, 2016)?
Some non-Inuit bureaucrats responsible for the 
enforcement of Nunavik’s wildlife regulations were aware 
of many of these tensions and were trying to respond 
to them. One representative from an Inuit organization 
commented that he thought the DFO had been trying 
its best to respond to Inuit complaints and adjust its 
administration of the beluga quotas. As one provincial 
regulator commented:
We’re the newcomers. We respect their [Inuit] 
traditions. It’s a fact that with the James Bay Agreement 
we respect their traditions; we respect their ancestral 
rights. Regulations are enforced […] in cases of abuse 
(author’s translation from French).
This official went on to say that the province did apply 
laws selectively. He gave the example of Inuit living in 
southern Quebec who lose their beneficiary status as a 
result of having been absent from the territory for more 
than 10 continuous years (JBNQA paragraph 3.2.7). He had 
overlooked instances where these Inuit had returned South 
with country foods after a visit to Nunavik, even though 
this was against the letter of the law. During the 2006 – 08 
period, non-Inuit bureaucrats from both the provincial and 
federal governments stressed that they routinely consulted 
Inuit, periodically visiting each community to ensure that 
they were responding to people’s needs and concerns (KRG 
et al., 2010). At the same time, some of the government 
representatives also acknowledged that their community 
consultations were problematic because Inuit were reticent 
to share their views about wildlife; they feared that these 
would be used against them to impose increasingly 
restrictive quotas in the name of conservation. Moreover, 
one representative of an Inuit organization involved in 
wildlife management stated that they had refused to help 
organize community consultations because doing so might 
make their organization appear complicit in any future 
regulations that limited Inuit harvesting. As another Inuk 
put it in a conversation about government agents, “They try 
in every way not to do things so others will do it for them.”
CHANGES BETWEEN FIRST AND
SECOND PHASES OF RESEARCH
From the research period 2007 – 08 to that of 2018, 
some issues had diminished in importance and others 
had increased. In the earlier period, for example, beluga 
harvesting was politically charged. By 2018, the Inuit 
to whom I spoke generally felt that things had settled 
down. But they warned that tensions could ignite again, 
particularly with respect to polar bears, whose hunt, Inuit 
feared, would become increasingly restricted by the 
government, due to concerns about climate change. 
If relations with the DFO over harvesting in marine 
regions appear to have improved, Inuit were more mixed 
in their views of the provincial Ministère des Forêts, 
de la Faune et des Parcs. One representative of an Inuit 
organization involved in wildlife management said in 2018 
that the MFFP continued to have a “colonial attitude and 
thinking,” although he hoped that this would improve as the 
older generation of bureaucrats retired. In contrast, an Inuk 
working for another ethnic organization felt that relations 
with the MFFP had improved over the last decade. A non-
Inuk involved in wildlife management in the region felt that 
the MFFP operated on a model that was punitive, like that 
of the police. He thought that in its work with the Inuit it 
needed to be more innovative and collaborative, facilitating 
more Inuit control over the management of wildlife (a view 
echoed in Parnasimautik). In his opinion the province still 
operated as it had in the 1980s. 
Between 2008 and 2018, falling caribou populations of the 
George River (George, 2011) and Leaf River (Rogers, 2016) 
herds were a growing concern. Provincial responses to the 
issue illustrate some of the difficulties experienced by Inuit in 
their relations with the province. For instance, Inuit had been 
demanding the closure of sport hunting of the Leaf River herd 
for more than three years before the Government of Quebec 
agreed to do so (Rogers, 2016). Meanwhile, a member of the 
regional HFTA told me that Inuit had voluntarily restricted 
their own caribou hunt (UPCART, 2017).
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article I posed a number of questions. 
To what degree have the commitments undertaken by the 
federal and provincial governments with respect to wildlife 
management been fulfilled? Given that the Indigenous 
parties to the JBNQA fought during negotiations to 
preserve the conditions that would permit them to continue 
to practice their subsistence activities, what has been the 
result? Does Brooke’s analysis of Nunavik Inuit experiences 
of wildlife management in 1995 continue to be relevant? 
As we have seen, the difficulties that Brooke identified 
in 1995 persist. Poor communication, lack of a common 
system of belief, the undermining of Inuit systems of 
management, insufficient funding, and so on, are all 
ongoing. Of particular importance are ongoing problems 
associated with the existence of complex administrative 
structures and insufficient power-sharing.
The various agencies, actors, laws, and regulations 
outlined in this article have all come into being in the region 
since 1975. Prior to that Inuit essentially regulated their own 
hunting, fishing, and trapping with minimal government 
interference. Forty years after the Agreement was signed, 
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the wildlife management regime in Nunavik has evolved. 
The NMRWB expanded the powers and areas covered 
by the region’s co-management boards. Inuit, through 
the Uumajuit Wardens program, are more involved in the 
enforcement of rules, albeit with lesser powers than were 
stipulated in the JBNQA. Inuit have become increasingly 
adept at recognising and manoeuvring their way through 
the structures and processes that define the region’s 
contemporary wildlife management system. The system 
itself, however, continues to develop and be administered 
through a complex network of bureaucratic structures. A 
remarkable number of agencies and boards are involved 
in the region’s wildlife management. Taking only the case 
of the co-management boards, there are seven in total. It 
would be interesting to compare the ways in which other 
jurisdictions manage (to avoid) similarly complex structures. 
The Inuvialuit Settlement Region, for example, has a Joint 
Secretariat that coordinates its co-management boards. 
Power sharing between Inuit and non-Inuit government 
agencies continues to be problematic. As Brooke (1995) 
points out, the limited authority the Agreement gave Inuit 
over their lands and resources ensured that it could not 
be easily used to promote power sharing. Genuine power 
sharing, she argues, would require self-government, which 
is not in effect in Nunavik. Involvement of Inuit in decision-
making has been strengthened (e.g., through the NILCA) 
but their role needs to be further strengthened. Despite 
the fact that the enforcement of regulations continues to 
be hampered by limited personnel with full powers, and 
despite the JBNQA’s commitment that these roles would 
be primarily occupied by Inidigenous peoples, the training 
and hiring of fully empowered Inuit game wardens appears 
to have stalled. The provincial and federal governments 
must respect their JBNQA commitment to find appropriate 
mechanisms for training and hiring that are adapted to local 
needs and realities. The Kativik Regional Government 
has been pushing for a revamping of the training of Inuit 
Conservation Officers and Fisheries Officers, so that the 
process of devolution may continue.
The devolution of powers is clearly an ongoing issue. 
For many Inuit in Nunavik the status quo will not do; 
they want self-government. In fact, having completed 
negotiations to that end, in a popular referendum in 2011, 
they rejected a proposed agreement to create a Nunavik 
Regional Government. This rejection was, in part, because 
the province insisted it be a public, rather than an ethnic 
government (Rodon and Grey, 2009); Inuit felt that a public 
government would not sufficiently reflect or promote their 
values and desire for self-government (Papillon, 2011; 
Hervé, 2017a, b). In the realm of wildlife management, 
such devolution of power requires both the regional and 
local HFTAs be given a strong, effective, and independent 
voice to represent local harvesters. The Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement and the Nunavut Agreement both gave 
funding and an official role to similar organizations. The 
same should be done in Nunavik so that the regional and 
local HFTAs can participate in all decisions, not only 
those covered by the NILCA. Fully funded and officially 
sanctioned participation by the HFTA in all realms of 
decision-making related to wildlife management has the 
potential to ensure that management systems will be guided 
by Inuit values and concepts central to their subsistence 
practices. In the long term, the success of the JBNQA 
and its partner agreement, the NILCA, must be judged 
on the issue of whether they have indeed fulfilled their 
commitments and enabled the Indigenous signatories to 
continue their subsistence practices. The ongoing impacts 
of climate change, coupled with Quebec’s Plan Nord, make 
the development of effective co-management in the region 
all the more necessary.
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